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Abstract
We analyze productivity spillovers of FDI on domestic companies, both within
and across industries. In the identiﬁcation of intraindustry spillovers, we separate out
labor market eﬀects from other eﬀects. Interindustry spillovers are identiﬁed through
upstream, downstream, and supply-backward linkage eﬀects. Dynamic input output
tables are used to construct the linkages. For a panel of Romanian ﬁrms, we ﬁnd
evidence that labor market eﬀects diﬀer from other intraindustry eﬀects. Spillovers
across industries dominate those within industries. The supply-backward eﬀect behaves
as predicted by theory. Firm-speciﬁc level of technology, ﬁrm size, and ownership
structure are all found to aﬀect spillovers.
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11 Introduction
When a ﬁrm invests in a foreign country, it often brings with it proprietary technology to
compete successfully with indigenous ﬁrms (James R. Markusen, 1995). Believing that this
transferred technology will be adopted by domestic ﬁrms, host country policymakers may
try to implement policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Unfortunately, such
faith in the positive spillover eﬀects of FDI contrasts starkly with the empirical evidence
(Dani Rodrik, 1999). The literature surveys of Holger Görg and David Greenaway (2004)
and Beata Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) conclude that there is no clear evidence of aggregate
positive spillovers from FDI.
Looking at the literature more closely, however, we see a distinction between spillovers
to ﬁrms in the same industries (intraindustry or horizontal spillovers) and spillovers to ﬁrms
in linked industries (interindustry or vertical spillovers). Horizontal spillovers have received
widespread attention, while the vertical spillover discussion launched by Dermot McAleese
and Donogh McDonald (1978) and Sanjaya Lall (1980) languished for two decades until its
recent revival by Koen Schoors and Bartoldus van der Tol (2002) and Smarzynska Javor-
cik. Schoors and van der Tol and Smarzynska Javorcik distinguish vertical spillovers that
occur through contacts between foreign ﬁrms and their local suppliers in upstream indus-
tries (backward spillovers) from those that occur through contacts between foreign ﬁrms
and their downstream customers (forward spillovers). Both studies suggest that spillovers
between industries dominate spillovers within industries.
To this mix, we add another type of interindustry spillover eﬀect — the supply-backward
spillover. Markusen and Anthony J. Venables (1999) theorize that “FDI may also create
demands for local output and these ‘backward linkages’ may strengthen supply industries,
this in turn feeding (via forward linkages) to other local ﬁrms” (Markusen and Venables,
pp. 336-37). In a two-sector model, they show how foreign investment may fuel demand
for locally produced intermediate products, encouraging local suppliers to produce inputs
conforming to higher foreign quality standards and eventually making local producers in
downstream industries more productive through the availability of better inputs.
We analyze productivity spillovers of FDI in a sample of domestic Romanian companies.
Our analysis extends the literature in ﬁve ways. i) We test for the presence of supply-
backward spillovers. ii) We better identify horizontal spillovers by separating out labor
market eﬀects from other eﬀects. iii) Although the literature suggests diﬀerent conditionali-
ties for spillovers, it analyzes them in isolation. We combine ﬁrm-speciﬁc level of technology,
degree of foreign ownership, and ﬁrm size and allow for possible non-linearities. iv) The few
papers that consider vertical spillovers use static input-output tables and a panel of ﬁrms.
2This creates an implicit assumption that the structure of the economy does not change over
time. We use instead a series of input-output tables. v) Rather than limiting our scope
to manufacturing industries, we consider all industries. A considerable amount of foreign
investment now goes to service industries such as transport, communication services, ﬁnan-
cial services, business services, and trade. These industries are important suppliers to the
rest of the economy and their improved productivity may have eﬀects on linked industries.
Failure to acknowledge the role of these industries in the production chain creates a strong
possibility of bias.
Our results indicate that horizontal spillovers via the labor market diﬀer from other
horizontal spillovers and that vertical spillovers are economically more important than hori-
zontal spillovers. The presence of a supply-backward spillover is strongly supported by the
data. Additionally, the dependence of spillovers on the degree of foreign ownership, ﬁrm
size, and the ﬁrm’s level of technology is non-linear. Ignoring non-manufacturing industries
and changes in the economic structure is shown to bias results.
This paper continues as follows. In section 1, we provide a short overview of the spillover
literature. Section 2 focuses on the interactions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc conditionalities: level of
technology, degree of foreign ownership, and ﬁrm size. Section 3 lays out the data and
the estimation strategy. Results and interpretation are provided in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Spillovers of foreign investment to local ﬁrm produc-
tivity
The literature has identiﬁed several channels through which FDI may aﬀect productivity
of ﬁrms in the host country. Here, we consider horizontal and vertical spillovers. Figure
1 illustrates how the spillovers considered in this paper run through the host economy’s
production chain.
Horizontal spillovers run from a foreign ﬁrm to a host country ﬁr mi nt h es a m ei n d u s -
try. David J. Teece (1977) suggests two main channels for horizontal spillovers: mobility
of workers trained by foreign ﬁrms (see Andrea Fosfuri et al., 2001, and Görg and Eric
Strobl, 2005) and technology imitation (the demonstration eﬀect). Foreign entry may also
fuel competition in the domestic market. Fiercer competition urges host country ﬁrms to
either use existing technologies and resources more eﬃciently or adopt new technologies and
organizational practices, which provides another important channel of horizontal spillover
(see Brian J. Aitken and Ann E. Harrison, 1999, and Amy Jocelyn Glass and Kamal Saggi,
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42002). None of these eﬀects is necessarily positive, however. Labor market dynamics may
entail negative spillovers such as a brain drain of local talent to foreign ﬁrms to the detriment
of local ﬁrm productivity (Garrick Blalock and Paul J. Gertler, 2004) or an overall increase
in wages irrespective of productivity improvements caused by foreign ﬁrms paying higher
wages (Aitken et al., 1996). Where foreign technology is easily copied, the foreign investor
may choose to avoid leakage costs on state-of-the-art technology by restricting its technol-
ogy transfer to technology that is only marginally superior to technology found in the host
country (see Glass and Saggi, 1998). Such policies obviously limit the scope for horizontal
spillovers via demonstration eﬀects. The higher productivity of foreign aﬃliates may also
lead to lower prices or less demand for the products of domestic competitors. If domestic
ﬁrms fail to respond to the increased competition and raise productivity, they will be pushed
up their average cost curves. Ultimately, domestic producers may not merely fall behind,
but fall by the wayside, driven out of business by the shock of foreign entry (see Aitken
and Harrison on this market-stealing eﬀect). These partial eﬀects are hard to disentangle
empirically. We identify labor market spillovers by including a measure that accounts for
labor market eﬀects next to a measure that incorporates the net eﬀect of all other spillovers.
As seen from the top panel in Figure 1, backward spillovers go from the foreign ﬁrm to its
upstream local suppliers. Thus, even if foreign ﬁrms attempt to minimize their technology
leakage to direct competitors (horizontal eﬀect), they may still want to assist their local
suppliers in providing inputs of suﬃcient quality in order to realize the full beneﬁts of their
investment. In other words, they want the inputs from the host country to be lower cost yet
similar in quality to inputs in the home country.1 If the foreign ﬁrm decides to source locally,
it may transfer technology to more than one domestic supplier and encourage upstream
technology diﬀusion to circumvent a hold-up problem. Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1996) shows
that the backward linkage eﬀect is more likely to be favorable when the good produced by the
foreign ﬁrm uses intermediate goods intensively and when the home and host countries are
similar in terms of the variety of intermediate goods produced. Under reversed conditions,
the backward linkage eﬀect could even damage the host country’s economy.
F i g u r e1a l s os u g g e s t sh o waf o r w a r dspillover goes from the foreign ﬁrm to its downstream
local buyer of inputs. The availability of better inputs due to foreign investment enhances
the productivity of ﬁrms that use these inputs. However, there is also a danger that inputs
produced locally by foreign ﬁrms are more expensive and less adapted to local requirements.
In this case there would be a negative forward spillover.
1This incentive is qualiﬁed, of course. First, when transportation costs between the home and host country
are low enough, MNCs can source inputs in their home country rather than in the host country. Second,
MNCs can put pressure on uncooperative local suppliers by inducing suppliers from their home country to
invest in the host country, creating an isolated enclave of mutually linked foreign ﬁrms.
5Finally, we note the supply-backward spillover mentioned in the bottom panel of Fig-
ure 1, which goes from the foreign ﬁrm through its local suppliers to the local customers
of these suppliers. Markusen and Venables suggest a trade-oﬀ between increased product
market competition, which they claim had an adverse eﬀect on productivity, and interindus-
try linkage eﬀects, which are said to be positive. When vertical linkage eﬀects are strong
enough, foreign investors can stimulate demand for locally produced intermediate products.
This demand stimulus encourages local suppliers to invest and produce inputs conforming
to higher quality standards (see also Magnus Blomström and Ari Kokko, 1998). This may
not only exert a positive eﬀect on the productivity of local intermediate good producers, but
may also stimulate the productivity of their local customers.2
3 Conditionalities
The existence, direction, and magnitude of spillovers may depend on ﬁrm-speciﬁcc h a r a c t e r i s -
tics. We consider how three characteristics — level of technology, degree of foreign ownership,
and ﬁrm size — interact to aﬀect FDI spillovers.
Ronald Findlay (1978) constructs a dynamic model of technology transfer through FDI
from developed to developing countries. He argues that there is a positive connection be-
tween the distance to the world’s technological frontier and economic growth. Findlay’s
model implies that productivity spillovers are an increasing function of the technology gap
between foreign and domestic ﬁrms. Measures of the level of technology, however, are com-
monly used as a measure of absorptive capability. This notion refers to the ability of ﬁrms
to assimilate outside knowledge and technology. Blomström (1986) ﬁnds that foreign ﬁrms
are more likely to eliminate the local competition when the initial level of technology is low
and human capital is poor, i.e. if the absorptive capability is low. Kokko et al. (1996) ﬁnd
that horizontal spillovers are positive and signiﬁcant only for plants with small or moderate
technology gaps relative to foreign ﬁrms. Fredrik Sjöholm (1999) notes that high technol-
ogy diﬀerences give rise to large spillovers, although results are sensitive to the choice of
technology measure. Examining a sample of Russian ﬁrms, Ksenia Yudaeva et al. (2003)
observe that the stock of human capital in regions where foreign ﬁrms operate is a factor in
determining the extent to which domestic ﬁrms beneﬁt from the entry of foreign ﬁrms. How-
ever, there is no theoretical ground for the assumption that technology aﬀects FDI spillovers
linearly. Findlay suggests that spillovers are a negative function of the level of technology,
while the absorptive capability interpretation suggests a positive relation.
2Because Markusen and Venables consider a two-sector model, local customers are always in the same
industry as foreign ﬁrms. We extend their idea to all local customers.
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Figure 2: Spillovers as a non-linear function of the level of technology
Figure 2 suggests roughly how these competing hypotheses might give rise to non-linear
relationships. Sourafel Girma and Görg (2005) oﬀer a U-shaped relationship between produc-
tivity growth and their horizontal spillover variable interacted with the level of technology.
Girma (2005) observes that horizontal spillovers increase with absorptive capability up to a
threshold level, beyond which the increase is much less pronounced.
The degree of foreign ownership also appears to play a role. Blomström and Sjöholm
(1999) suggest that productivity spillovers increase with local participation in the foreign
ﬁrm because it facilitates access to foreign technology. This creates a tension, however,
as foreign ﬁrms with extensive local participation have less control over their proprietary
knowledge, which may make them reluctant to bring in state-of-the-art technology when they
seek to reduce technology leakage. In a cross-section analysis of Indian ﬁrms, Blomström and
Sjöholm ﬁnd that establishments with minority and majority foreign ownership diﬀer in the
degree of FDI spillovers. Smarzynska Javorcik and Mariana Spatareanu (2003) perform the
same test in a panel of Romanian ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that positive horizontal spillovers originate
from majority foreign-owned ﬁrms, because they bring more advanced technology with them,
while minority foreign-owned ﬁrms are associated with negative horizontal spillovers. With
respect to backward spillovers, the direction of the eﬀect switches. Minority foreign-owned
ﬁrms give rise to positive backward spillovers, while majority foreign-owned ﬁrms give rise to
negative backward spillovers. This is probably explained by the fact that ﬁrms with higher
local participation are more likely to buy their inputs locally. Smarzynska Javorcik’s own
ﬁndings for Lithuania support this explanation.
Thirdly, ﬁrm size may be important. If larger ﬁrms have greater resources with which to
7exploit innovative opportunities, they should be able to beneﬁt more from foreign technology.
On the other hand, small and medium-sized ﬁrms are often important sources of innovation.
Small ﬁrms make important contributions to innovation because they are less bureaucratic
and exploit innovations that might otherwise appear insigniﬁcant to large ﬁrms (Evis Sinani
and Klaus E. Meyer, 2004). This appears to be the case in Romania, where large enterprises
(typically former state enterprises) remain clumsy at adopting new technologies or adapting
to market changes.
4 Empirical approach, data and variables
4.1 Empirical approach
We use a two-step procedure. The ﬁrst step consists in the estimation of a standard produc-
tion function. The second step relates the estimated total factor productivity to measures
of FDI spillovers and several control variables.
Our initial problem is that ﬁrms react to ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks that are not
observed by the researcher. For example, a ﬁrm confronted with a large positive productivity
shock might respond by using more inputs. Zvi Griliches and Jacques Mairesse (1995)
provide a detailed account of this problem and make the case that inputs should be treated as
endogenous variables since they are chosen on the basis of the ﬁrm’s unobservable assessment
of its productivity. OLS estimates of production functions therefore yield biased estimates
of factor shares and biased estimates of productivity.3 We thus employ the semi-parametric
approach suggested by Steven G. Olley and Ariel Pakes (1996) and subsequently modiﬁed
by James Levinsohn and Amil Petrin (2003). While details on the methodology appear in
Appendix A, it is suﬃc i e n th e r et on o t et h a ti ta l l o w sf o rﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity diﬀerences
that exhibit idiosyncratic changes over time. We estimate domestic industry production
functions for each industry j in the period 1998—2001, excluding foreign ﬁrms from the
estimation. A measure of total factor productivity tfpit is obtained as the diﬀerence between
value added and capital and labor inputs, multiplied by their estimated coeﬃcients:
∀j : tfpit = vait − b βllit − b βkkit (1)
In the second step, we relate tfpijrt to a vector of spillover variables, FDI, a concentration
index, H, and industry, region, and time dummies (αj, αr,a n dαt). Note that we pool
industries for the estimation of (2), whereas (1) is an industry-speciﬁc estimation.
3Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of labor is biased upwards, while the capital coeﬃcient is biased downwards.
8tfpijrt = αi + Ψ1f (FDIjt,T ijrt)
0 + α2Hjt + αj + αr + αt + εijrt (2)
Concentration (Hjt)i sm e a s u r e db yt h eH e r ﬁndahl concentration index. The theoretical
literature is inconclusive as to the impact of competition on productivity. Stephen J. Nickell
(1996) ﬁnds a positive impact of competition on ﬁrm performance, which suggests a negative
sign for α2. The vector of spillover variables (FDIjt)c o v e r sd i ﬀerent transformations of
the horizontal and vertical spillovers. We ﬁrst look at the spillover variables traditionally
considered in the literature. Next, we add the horizontal labor market spillover and the
supply-backward spillover. We then interact the spillover variables with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
level of technology (Tijrt) in a non-linear way. Finally, we consider whether the degree of
foreign ownership and ﬁrm size play a role. Speciﬁcation (2) is ﬁrst diﬀerenced and estimated
as a ﬁxed eﬀects model:
∆tfpijrt = βi + Ω1∆f (FDIjt,T ijrt)
0 + β2Hjt + βt + εijrt (3)
The ﬁxed eﬀects control for all time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobservables driving produc-
tivity growth, including region and industry eﬀects. The ﬁrst-diﬀerenced time dummies still
control for the business cycle. Because FDIjt and Hjt are deﬁned at the industry level, while
estimations are performed at the ﬁrm level, standard errors need to be adjusted (see Brent
R. Moulton, 1990). Standard errors are clustered for all observations in the same industry
and year.
4.2 Data description and variable deﬁnitions
Romanian ﬁrm-level data for 1996—2001 are drawn from the Amadeus database published
on DVD and CD by Bureau Van Dijk. The entire Amadeus series is used to construct a
database of time-speciﬁc foreign entry in local Romanian ﬁrms.4 T h es a m p l ei su n b a l a n c e d
due to ﬁrms entering in later years, both because of increased coverage and new start-ups.
There is no exit. Industry price level data at Nace 2-digit level5 are taken from the Industrial
Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
and from the Statistical Yearbook of the Romanian National Statistical Oﬃce (RNSO).
Our industry classiﬁcation follows the classiﬁcation used in the Romanian input-output (IO)
4Amadeus DVDs are released each year. They provide a pan-European database of ﬁnancial information
on public and private companies. Speciﬁc entries, however, only indicate the most recent ownership informa-
tion. Since ownership information is gathered at irregular intervals, we do not have ownership information
for all years and ﬁrms. Ownership changes tend to show up ex post in the database. Therefore, if a given
ﬁr mh a sa n yg a p si ni t so w n e r s h i ps e r i e s ,w eﬁll the gaps with the information from the following year.
5Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les Communautés européennes.
9tables. This classiﬁcation is then linked to the Nace classiﬁcation scheme. IO tables for the
period 1995—2001 were obtained from the RNSO.
The matrix FDI in (3) contains measures of foreign presence to capture the diﬀerent
spillovers described above. We classify a ﬁrm as foreign (Foreign=1 ) when foreign partic-
ipation exceeds 10%.6 The horizontal spillover variable HorizontalX
jt captures the degree of
f o r e i g np r e s e n c ei ns e c t o rj at time t and is measured as:
Horizontal
X
jt =
P
i∈j Foreignit ∗ Xit P
i∈j Xit
(4)
where Xit refers to either employment Lit for the horizontal labor market spillover, and real
output Yit for the net other horizontal spillover. Horizontal
Y (L)
kt is industry k’s share of
output (labor) produced (employed) by foreign-owned ﬁrms.
For the measurement of the backward spillover variable Backwardjt, one possibility might
be to employ the share of ﬁrm output sold to foreign ﬁrms. However, this information is
unavailable from our dataset. Moreover, the share of ﬁrm output sold to foreign-owned ﬁrms
may cause endogeneity problems if the latter prefer to buy inputs from more productive
domestic ﬁrms. We thus measure Backwardjt as:
Backwardjt =
X
ki fk 6=j
γjkt ∗ Horizontal
Y
kt (5)
where γjkt is the proportion of industry j’s output supplied to sourcing industry k at time t.
The γs are calculated from the time-varying IO tables for intermediate consumption. In the
calculation of γ, we explicitly exclude inputs sold within the ﬁrm’s industry (k 6= j) because
this is captured by HorizontalY
jt.7 Since ﬁrms cannot easily switch between industries for
their inputs, we avoid the problem of endogeneity by using the share of industry output sold
to downstream domestic markets k with some level of foreign presence HorizontalY
kt.I nt h e
same spirit, we deﬁne the forward spillover variable Forwardjt as:
Forwardjt =
X
li fl 6=j
δjlt ∗ Horizontal
Y
lt (6)
where the IO tables reveal the proportion δjlt of industry j’s inputs purchased from upstream
6This threshold level is commonly applied (e.g. by the OECD) in FDI deﬁnitions.
7To clarify, we oﬀer the following example. Consider three sectors: j, k1,a n dk2. Suppose that half of
the output of j is purchased by k1 and the other half by k2. Further suppose that no foreign ﬁrms are active
in k1, but half of the output of k2 is produced by foreign ﬁrms. The backward variable for sector j would be
(0.5 ∗ 0.0) + (0.5 ∗ 0.5) = 0.25. From this, it can be easily seen that the value of Backward increases with
foreign presence in the sectors k that source inputs from j and with the share of output of sector j supplied
to industries with foreign presence.
10industries l. Inputs purchased within the industry (l 6= j) are again excluded, since this is
already captured by Horizontal.8
The variable SupplyBackwardjt, which captures the hypothesis of Markusen and Ven-
ables, is constructed as:
SupplyBackwardjt =
X
li fl 6=j
δjlt ∗ Backwardlt (7)
where δjlt r e v e a l sa g a i nt h ep r o p o r t i o no fi n d u s t r yj’s inputs purchased from upstream
industries l that in turn supply the downstream industries of foreign ﬁr m sa sm e a s u r e d
by Backwardlt.I d e n t i ﬁcation is possible as long as the share of industry a’s output supplied
to its downstream industry b, i.e. γab,i ss u ﬃciently diﬀerent from the share of industry b’s
inputs purchased from upstream industry a, i.e. δba. This is the case for our IO tables.
The above deﬁnitions are based on a dummy-variable version of Foreign. This approach
excludes any possible relation between spillover eﬀects and the level of foreign participation.
The Amadeus database contains the exact share in total equity owned by foreign investors at
the ﬁrm level. Using the exact share, however, implicitly assumes a linear relation between
the degree of foreign ownership and the spillover. Thus, we also employ an alternative
classiﬁcation based on relevant thresholds of foreign ownership — minority, majority or full
foreign ownership — which gives rise to three separate measures of Foreignand three versions
of each spillover variable.
A measure of the level of technology needs to reﬂect the relative technical capabilities of
a domestic ﬁrm vis-à-vis the foreign ﬁrms in the same industry. In constructing measure Tit,
we apply the Levinsohn-Petrin technique on earlier years of the full sample of both domestic
and foreign ﬁrms to avoid endogeneity. The estimated relation is then used to derive total
factor productivity measures ϕit for all ﬁrms. Tit is deﬁned in (8) as the distance between
ﬁrm i’s lagged productivity level, ϕit−1, and the lagged “foreign frontier” in its industry. The
latter is deﬁned as the mean productive eﬃciency of the 25% most productive foreign ﬁrms
in industry j (ϕjt−1,FOR). More productive ﬁr m sh a v eh i g h e rv a l u e so fT.
Tit =
ϕit−1
ϕjt−1,FOR
(8)
We integrate the level of technology in the analysis by considering the interaction of T
8Consider three sectors: j, l1,a n dl2. Suppose j buys 75% of its inputs with l1 and the remaining 25%
with l2. Further suppose that 10% of l1’s output is produced by foreign ﬁrms, and half of the output of l2 is
produced by foreign ﬁrms. The backward variable for sector j would be (0.75 ∗ 0.10) + (0.25 ∗ 0.50) = 0.20.
11full sample domestic sample
(n=215516) (n=192851)
mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
ln real value added 8.308 2.052 8.149 1.989
ln real capital 7.366 2.460 7.185 2.407
ln labor 1.823 1.457 1.737 1.407
ln TFP 5.338 1.201 5.284 1.176
l e v e lo ft e c h n o l o g y 0.171 0.190 0.160 0.179
Herﬁndahl 0.025 0.046 0.024 0.044
Horizontal
Y 0.256 0.156 0.248 0.153
Horizontal
L 0.190 0.149 0.183 0.145
Backward 0.257 0.074 0.256 0.076
Forward 0.303 0.073 0.303 0.073
SupplyBackward 0.266 0.039 0.265 0.039
Table 1: Summary statistics for the full and domestic sample
with Horizontal, Backward, Forward,a n dSupplyBackward. Since the above discussion
suggests possible non-linearities, we consider interactions with the squared level of technology
(T2). Table 1 gives summary statistics for the variables described here.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Dynamic economic structure
In Table 2, we show a baseline version of (3) to verify whether changes in economic structure
matter for FDI spillovers. The estimates in the ﬁrst column are based on spillover variables
calculated with the correct time-varying IO tables. Vertical spillovers are economically and
statistically more signiﬁcant than horizontal spillovers. Backward spillovers carry a negative
sign, while forward spillovers are positive. In the following columns, we recalculate the
spillover variables using the IO table for a speciﬁc year. This is the current practice in much
of the literature, mostly because of data limitations. As can be seen, the results are fairly
m u r k ya n dd e p e n do nt h ey e a ro fc h o i c ef o rt h eI Ot a b l e .W ec o n c l u d et h a tt h et i m ev a r y i n g
character of Romania’s economic structure is important in understanding the reaction of
Romanian ﬁrms to FDI. Failure to take this into account may bias results.
12IO-98/01 IO-96 IO-98 IO-99 IO-00 IO-01
∆Horizontal
Y 0.221 0.100 0.002 -0.144 -0.145 -0.143
[0.41] [0.18] [0.00] [0.26] [0.26] [0.25]
∆Backward -0.567 0.020 -2.021 -0.183 -1.679 -0.793
[2.17]** [0.01] [1.08] [0.16] [1.03] [0.39]
∆Forward 1.412 1.708 1.620 -0.257 -0.145 -0.227
[2.34]** [2.18]** [1.77]* [0.28] [0.17] [0.32]
N 150626 150626 150626 150626 150626 150626
# ﬁrms 68233 68233 68233 68233 68233 68233
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Second-step ﬁxed eﬀect estimates for domestic ﬁrms; the dependent variable is ﬁrm-level TFP growth based
on ﬁrst-step production function estimates. Column headings refer to the year of the IOtable.
Robust t-statistics in brackets; */**/*** signiﬁcant at 10%/5%/1%.
Table 2: Impact of dynamic input output tables on estimated spillover eﬀects
5.2 Labor market and supply-backward spillover
In Table 3, we introduce the horizontal labor market spillover and the supply-backward
spillover. Panel A reports the results for all industries. We report diﬀerent combinations
of the variables. In contrast to Jozef Konings (2001), we ﬁnd that local ﬁrm productivity
is enhanced by horizontal labor market spillovers. This ﬁnding is robust throughout and
conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Görg and Strobl. Other horizontal spillovers exert no positive eﬀect
on local ﬁrm productivity. Inspection of the coeﬃcients of the vertical spillover variables
reveals that the supply-backward spillover is economically much more important than hori-
zontal spillovers. The estimated coeﬃcient for the supply-backward spillover is consistently
positive and is inclined to be statistically signiﬁcant. This lends support to the hypothesis
of Markusen and Venables. Forward linkages to foreign ﬁrms are found to fuel total factor
productivity of domestic ﬁrms, while backward linkages to foreign ﬁrms appear detrimental
to total factor productivity. In panel B, we repeat our estimations for manufacturing in-
dustries only. We employ reduced IO tables for manufacturing to recalculate the spillover
variables. The results change drastically. Most spillovers are no longer statistically diﬀerent
from zero. Only the backward spillover retains its statistical signiﬁcance. The economic
conclusion is now in line with earlier ﬁndings: backward links of local manufacturing ﬁrms
to foreign ﬁrms are now beneﬁcial to total factor productivity. This should not come as a
surprise. According to Romania’s National Trade Register Oﬃce,9 4% of all foreign aﬃliates
in Romania were located in the primary sector, 19% in the secondary sector, and 77% in the
tertiary sector at the end of 2002. Limiting the analysis to manufacturing ignores the lion’s
9Data reported in the World Investment Report 2005, UNCTAD.
13Panel A - Results for all industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Horizontal
Y -0.020 -0.142 -0.041 -0.389 -0.334
[0.04] [0.25] [0.07] [0.66] [0.57]
∆Horizontal
L 0.749 0.799 0.761 0.690
[2.30]** [2.41]** [2.23]** [2.16]**
∆Backward -0.701 -0.676 -0.619 -0.562
[2.56]** [2.81]*** [2.52]** [2.28]**
∆Forward 1.183 1.325 1.489 1.196
[2.02]** [2.22]** [2.60]*** [1.99]**
∆Supply-Backward 2.767 2.073 1.695 3.027
[2.16]** [1.64] [1.37] [2.59]***
N 150626 150626 150626 150626 150626
# ﬁrms 68233 68233 68233 68233 68233
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Panel B - Results for manufacturing industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Horizontal
Y -0.106 -0.076 -0.069 -0.041 -0.078
[1.11] [0.81] [0.77] [0.42] [0.85]
∆Horizontal
L -0.208 -0.218 -0.192 -0.214
[1.19] [1.25] [1.10] [1.14]
∆Backward 0.501 0.523 0.530 0.533
[2.20]** [2.32]** [2.38]** [2.33]**
∆Forward 0.103 0.038 0.034 0.140
[0.46] [0.20] [0.17] [0.70]
∆Supply-Backward 0.361 0.266 0.325 0.262
[0.68] [0.51] [0.61] [0.51]
N 55629 55629 55629 55629 55629
# ﬁrms 25096 25096 25096 25096 25096
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Second-step ﬁxed eﬀect estimates for domestic ﬁrms; the dependent variable is ﬁrm-level TFP growth based
on ﬁrst-step production function estimates. Robust t-statistics in brackets;*/**/*** signiﬁcant at 10%/5%/1%.
Table 3: Eﬀect of introducing of the horizontal labor market spillover and the supply-
backward spillover variables
14share of foreign aﬃliates operating in Romania. Many are upstream service industries, and
neglecting the eﬀect of their improved productivity on the rest of the economy could well
lead to inappropriate conclusions.
5.3 Level of technology
In Table 4, we allow non-linear interactions of the spillover variables with the level of tech-
nology.10 The ﬁrst column gives the results for all ﬁrms, while further columns give results
for three split samples: small, medium-sized, and large ﬁrms. The implied non-linear rela-
tion between the spillovers and the level of technology is shown in Figure 5 in Appendix B.
The interaction between spillover variables and the level of technology cannot be rejected.
Even the output-based horizontal spillover exhibits a signiﬁcant interaction with the level of
technology for small and medium-sized ﬁrms. The interaction with the level of technology
turns out to be non-linear, except for supply-backward spillovers to medium-sized and large
ﬁrms.
Firm size plays an important role. Generally, spillover eﬀects seem to be larger for
small and medium-sized ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms in both directions. On one hand, smaller
ﬁrms may more easily adapt to newer and better inputs and ﬁnd it easier to adjust their
production processes, which allows larger positive spillovers. On the other hand, they may
be less resilient to potential negative spillovers as they face harder budget constraints. This
could be speciﬁcally true for Romania. Most large enterprises are former state enterprises
that, while poor at adopting new technologies, are well connected to the sources of soft
ﬁnance.
The horizontal labor market spillover seems to be very positive, although the relation
is not highly stable across size classes. F-tests reject zero labor market eﬀects. The non-
linear interaction with the level of technology (small ﬁrms excluded) is not rejected. This
lends support to the absorptive capability hypothesis. Access to higher skilled labor through
foreign presence in the industry is positive for all domestic ﬁrms, though most of the beneﬁts
go to ﬁrms that were already more productive. The backward spillover is found to be
mainly negative, but the interaction with the level of technology is not very stable across
size classes. For every size class, F-tests reject that the forward spillover is not present. The
forward spillover also exhibits a very signiﬁcant and stable non-linear interaction with the
level of technology across size classes. The results reveal a U-shape relation between the
level of technology and the contribution of forward spillovers to total factor productivity.
This lends support to the conjecture that both the Findlay and the absorptive capability
10The results for manufacturing only are available on request.
15All ﬁrms L<55 <=L<50 L>=50
∆Horizontal
Y -0.293 -0.503 0.129 -1.054
[0.50] [0.79] [0.25] [2.29]**
∆
¡
T ∗ Horizontal
Y¢
1.086 4.538 0.758 1.023
[1.17] [3.38]*** [0.82] [1.36]
∆
¡
T2∗Horizontal
Y¢
-0.515 -2.446 -0.851 -0.626
[1.32] [3.82]*** [2.23]** [1.38]
∆Horizontal
L 0.960 1.166 0.686 0.175
[2.54]** [3.17]*** [2.18]** [0.57]
∆
¡
T ∗ Horizontal
L¢
-1.153 -1.542 -0.950 -1.032
[1.61] [1.59] [1.28] [1.30]
∆
¡
T2∗Horizontal
L¢
0.756 0.606 1.227 1.054
[2.10]** [0.82] [2.48]** [2.23]**
∆Backward -0.893 -0.989 -0.785 -0.507
[3.68]*** [3.70]*** [3.59]*** [1.88]*
∆(T ∗ Backward) 1.442 1.106 0.928 1.424
[2.07]** [0.94] [1.26] [1.33]
∆(T2∗Backward) -1.524 -1.444 -1.354 -0.835
[3.47]*** [1.55] [2.56]** [1.22]
∆Forward 2.328 2.337 1.953 1.728
[3.64]*** [3.67]*** [3.11]*** [3.78]***
∆(T ∗ Forward) -4.139 -3.132 -2.973 -4.025
[2.60]*** [1.69]* [1.50] [3.56]***
∆(T2∗Forward) 3.029 3.390 3.258 2.412
[3.38]*** [3.19]*** [2.96]*** [4.78]***
∆Supply-Backward 1.959 2.530 2.801 -0.484
[1.74]* [1.87]* [2.67]*** [0.50]
∆(T ∗ Supply − Backward) -4.309 -12.737 -4.369 -0.914
[2.04]** [4.41]*** [1.84]* [0.50]
∆(T2∗Supply − Backward) 0.381 4.465 -0.072 -1.061
[0.30] [2.75]*** [0.05] [1.11]
N 120317 56095 53348 10874
# ﬁrms 55097 30866 26351 4993
R2 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.13
Second-step ﬁxed eﬀect estimates for domestic ﬁrms; the dependent variable is ﬁrm-level TFP growth based
on the ﬁrst-step production function estimates. Columns 2-4 are split-samples according to the domestic ﬁrm’s
number of employees (L). Robust t-statistics in brackets; */**/*** signiﬁcant at 10%/5%/1%.
Table 4: Impact of the interaction of spillover variables with the level of technology (T) and
sample splits based on ﬁrm size (L) - Results for all industries
16All ﬁrms L<55 <=L<50 L>=50
F-tests
No T-Horizontal
L 2.32* 1.50 4.36** 3.32**
No Horizontal
L 3.94*** 3.35** 5.32*** 2.23*
No T-Horizontal
Y 0.87 7.29*** 4.10** 1.02
No Horizontal
Y 0.59 5.11*** 2.83** 2.26*
No T-Backward 6.61*** 1.37 4.12** 0.89
No Backward 7.78*** 5.35*** 6.53*** 1.27
No T-Forward 6.26*** 6.81*** 7.50*** 11.62***
No Forward 6.81*** 7.69*** 6.64*** 9.17***
No T-SupplyBackward 6.38*** 11.71*** 6.61*** 4.97***
No SupplyBackward 4.56*** 8.36*** 6.34*** 4.09***
T-’Spillover’ tests the joint signiﬁcance of the T and T2 interactions, ’Spillover’ the joint signiﬁcance
of the T and T2 interactions and the level of Spillover.Columns 2-4 are split-samples according
to the domestic ﬁrm’s number of employees (L). */**/*** rejection at 10%/5%/1%.
Table 5: Impact of the interaction of spillover variables with the level of technology (T) and
sample splits based on ﬁrm size (L) - Results for all industries - F-tests
hypothesis are at work. Nevertheless, the exact shape of the relation suggests that the access
to better inputs because of foreign direct investment mainly beneﬁt st h em o r ep r o d u c t i v e
domestic ﬁrms. The supply-backward spillover is strongly detected for small ﬁrms, and less
convincingly for medium-sized and large ﬁrms. Better inputs through foreign presence in not
directly related industries mainly beneﬁts small ﬁrms, provided that their level of technology
is high enough to absorb these better inputs.
5.4 Degree of foreign ownership
In our third step, we verify whether spillovers depend on the ownership structure of foreign-
owned ﬁrms. We create separate variables for spillovers from fully foreign-owned ﬁrms (more
than 95%), majority foreign-owned ﬁrms (more than 50%, but less than 95%), and minority
foreign-owned ﬁrms (less than 50%), and repeat the speciﬁcation of Table 4 with a full, a
majority and a minority foreign-ownership version of each spillover variable. The results
and joint signiﬁcance tests for the various spillovers and their interactions with the level of
technology are reported in Appendix C.11
In ﬁgures 3 and 4, we show the implied non-linear relationships between the level of
technology and the spillovers for diﬀerent size classes and diﬀerent degrees of foreign own-
11The results for manufacturing only are available on request. They consider split majority (>50%) versus
minority (<5 0 % )o w n e r s h i p ,a sw e l la ss p l i tf u l l( >95%) versus partial (<95%) ownership.
17ership.12 In each subﬁgure, the bold solid line represents the estimated relationship for all
ﬁrms, the ﬁne solid line refers to small ﬁrms, the dotted line to medium-sized ﬁrms, and the
broken line to large ﬁrms. The level of technology is shown on the horizontal axis, while
the eﬀect of the spillover on total factor productivity is on the vertical axis. Horizontal
labor market spillovers exhibit a clear U-shaped relationship with the level of technology
for fully and majority foreign-owned ﬁrms. Horizontal labor market spillovers are especially
beneﬁcial where the labor comes from fully-owned foreign ﬁrms, less so for labor from ma-
jority foreign-owned ﬁrms, and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (not reported here) for
labor from minority foreign-owned ﬁrms. Other net horizontal spillovers are only signiﬁcant
for ﬁrms that compete with fully foreign-owned ﬁrms, where there is a positive eﬀect on
productivity unless the absorptive capability is very low (as shown in Figure 3). Hence, the
market-stealing eﬀect only applies to the least productive local ﬁrms facing competition from
fully foreign-owned ﬁrms. Comparison of the size of the eﬀect on total factor productivity in
the various panels of ﬁgures 3 and 4 reveals that horizontal spillovers are economically less
signiﬁcant than vertical spillovers.
F-tests in Appendix C indicate that the joint signiﬁcance of backward spillovers and their
non-linear interactions with the level of technology can almost never be rejected. Domes-
tic ﬁrms that supply intermediates to industries with many full or majority foreign-owned
aﬃliates experience relatively negative backward spillovers. For a given level of technology,
the backward spillover is generally more likely to be positive for large local ﬁrms than for
medium-sized or small local ﬁrms. This is not true for minority foreign-owned aﬃliates.
Since minority foreign-owned aﬃliates are dominated by local partners that are well con-
nected to the local market, they are more likely to source their inputs with relatively smaller
local ﬁrms. It is not surprising therefore that small ﬁrms upstream of minority foreign-owned
aﬃliates tend to enjoy large positive backward spillovers when the local ﬁrm’s absorptive
capability is suﬃciently high. In the previous section, we found that forward spillovers were
U-shaped. Introducing the degree of foreign ownership reveals that the signiﬁcance of this
result mainly depends on majority foreign-owned aﬃliates. In this case, we ﬁnd a clear pos-
itive forward spillover is consistently present across size classes. Inspection of the implied
relation in Figure 4 does not allow us to reject this earlier ﬁnding of a U-shaped relationship.
We ﬁnd very strong support for the presence of a supply-backward spillover. Across
size classes, its joint signiﬁcance is never rejected and the joint signiﬁcance of the interac-
tion with the level of technology only once. A domestic ﬁrm’s total factor productivity is
12To describe the contribution of a spillover to total factor productivity growth as a function of the level
of technology, we ﬁrst construct a weighted average of the spillover variable concerned (weights are the
number of ﬁrms in an industry). Multiplying the weighted average with the estimated coeﬃcients gives the
parameters of this function.
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Figure 3: Horizontal and backward spillover eﬀects on ﬁrm-level TFP (vertical axis) as a
function the level of technology (T,h o r i z o n t a la x i s )f o rd i ﬀerent classes of foreign ownership
and ﬁrm size (L denotes the number of employees)
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Figure 4: Forward and supply-backward spillover eﬀects on ﬁrm-level TFP (vertical axis) as
a function the level of technology (T,h o r i z o n t a la x i s )f o rd i ﬀerent classes of foreign ownership
and ﬁrm size (L denotes the number of employees)
20strongly aﬀected by buying inputs from ﬁrms that also supply to foreign-owned aﬃliates.
Economically, this eﬀect dominates other spillovers. Although we note no supply-backward
spillovers for large ﬁr m si nT a b l e4 ,t h ei n t e r a c t i o nw i t ht h ed e g r e eo ff o r e i g no w n e r s h i p
reveals important supply-backward eﬀects from fully and majority foreign-owned ﬁrms. The
eﬀects for small ﬁrms are large and strongly depend on the degree of foreign ownership and
the level of technology. Small ﬁrms suﬀer negative supply-backward spillovers from fully
foreign-owned ﬁrms, except where they are technologically backward (Findlay hypothesis).
On the other hand, small ﬁrms with supply-backward linkages to less than fully foreign-
owned ﬁrms enjoy large positive productivity spillovers, provided their absorptive capability
exceeds a minimal threshold. This may reﬂect the fact that foreign ﬁrms that are not fully
foreign-owned develop closer relationships with domestic suppliers. It follows that domestic
suppliers will have greater incentives to tailor their production standards to the needs of
such ﬁrms. Domestic ﬁrms that buy intermediates from these suppliers will ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to use these more speciﬁc inputs in their own production when their absorptive capability
is insuﬃcient. Domestic ﬁrms with higher absorptive capability, on the other hand, are able
to use higher quality inputs to improve their own productivity.
5.5 Actual spillover eﬀects
Finally, we use the results of Table 7 in Appendix C to calculate the net eﬀect of foreign
presence on domestic ﬁrms. For each ﬁrm we predict ﬁrm level spillovers by multiplying
the estimated coeﬃcients with the actual values of the variables concerned. Table 6 shows
the spillovers’ contribution to total factor productivity growth during the period 1998—2001,
averaged over ﬁrms for diﬀerent ranges of the initial level of technology. The breakdown in
technology ranges is based on the 1998 level of technology percentiles.
Results in table 6 reveal that the average Romanian ﬁrm enjoys positive total net
spillovers at any initial level of technology. The eﬀect is distinctively positive for ﬁrms with
the highest level of technology, which indicates that absorption is important. The supply-
backward spillover has contributed most to the productivity growth of Romanian ﬁrms. It
accounts for more than 50 percent of total net spillovers and is especially important for small
and medium-sized ﬁrms. The forward spillover, in contrast, is highly positive for large ﬁrms,
while the eﬀect is smaller, but still positive, for small and medium-sized ﬁrms. Apparently,
better inputs explain the lion’s share of FDI-fueled productivity growth. Backward spillovers
are positive for large ﬁrms, but often detrimental to small and medium-sized ﬁrms. Large
ﬁrms draw apparently more beneﬁts from their linkages to foreign clients. It unclear as why
foreign clients seem less eager to transfer technology to small local ﬁrms; perhaps it is a
21Horizontal
Y Horizontal
L Backward Forward SupplyBack Total
All -0.0159 0.0414 -0.0039 0.0287 0.2473 0.2975
p1<IT<p10 -0.0073 0.0369 0.0311 0.0176 0.2529 0.3311
p10<IT<p25 -0.0086 0.0312 0.0182 -0.0001 0.2527 0.2934
p25<IT<p50 -0.0095 0.0290 -0.0022 -0.0095 0.2422 0.2500
p50<IT<p75 -0.0126 0.0416 -0.0134 0.0235 0.2280 0.2672
p75<IT<p90 -0.0269 0.0591 -0.0193 0.0736 0.2446 0.3310
p90<IT<p99 -0.0365 0.0550 -0.0065 0.1073 0.3076 0.4268
L<5 -0.0110 0.0487 -0.0094 0.0346 0.2629 0.3258
p1<IT<p10 0.0151 0.0488 0.0057 0.0549 0.2380 0.3625
p10<IT<p25 0.0105 0.0402 0.0008 0.0297 0.2423 0.3235
p25<IT<p50 0.0086 0.0306 -0.0256 0.0037 0.2262 0.2436
p50<IT<p75 -0.0063 0.0431 -0.0232 0.0174 0.2442 0.2752
p75<IT<p90 -0.0380 0.0745 -0.0012 0.0664 0.2898 0.3915
p90<IT<p99 -0.0891 0.0852 0.0338 0.1081 0.4272 0.5652
5<L<50 0.0072 0.0323 0.0072 0.0278 0.2856 0.3601
p1<IT<p10 0.0188 0.0193 0.0273 0.0098 0.2542 0.3294
p10<IT<p25 0.0167 0.0212 0.0216 0.0049 0.2633 0.3277
p25<IT<p50 0.0117 0.0266 -0.0006 0.0104 0.2622 0.3102
p50<IT<p75 0.0002 0.0407 -0.0021 0.0259 0.2806 0.3454
p75<IT<p90 -0.0108 0.0523 0.0042 0.0709 0.3028 0.4194
p90<IT<p99 0.0208 0.0189 0.0211 0.0635 0.4066 0.5310
L>50 -0.0364 0.0148 0.0158 0.1215 0.1955 0.3112
p1<IT<p10 -0.0197 0.0225 0.0254 0.1342 0.2052 0.3676
p10<IT<p25 -0.0204 0.0092 0.0135 0.0778 0.2127 0.2928
p25<IT<p50 -0.0208 0.0099 0.0107 0.0624 0.1938 0.2560
p50<IT<p75 -0.0309 0.0159 0.0161 0.1172 0.1840 0.3022
p75<IT<p90 -0.0582 0.0211 0.0201 0.1718 0.1870 0.3419
p90<IT<p99 -0.0536 0.0084 0.0159 0.1841 0.2214 0.3761
Table entries are averaged ﬁrm-level predictions of the spillover’s (the column headings) contribution to TFP growth during the period
1998—2001 for diﬀerent ranges of the 1998 level of technology (IT). pX refers to the Xth percentile of the distribution of IT. Predictions
are obtained by multiplying the appropriate estimated coeﬃ cients with the actual values of the spillover variables concerned. Size
classes are based on the number of employees L. The ﬁrst line for each size class lists the average over all ﬁrms.
Table 6: Actual domestic ﬁrm TFP-increase during 1998-2001 due to spillover eﬀects for
diﬀerent categories of ﬁrm size (L) and the initial level of technology in 1998 (IT)
22lack of awareness or perhaps there is greater worry over technology leakage. Interestingly,
horizontal labor market spillovers are always positive and dominate the other net horizontal
spillovers. Labor market spillovers are especially beneﬁcial to small ﬁrms, and nearly zero
for large ﬁrms, conﬁrming the F-tests above. The other horizontal spillovers are not only
smaller than labor market spillovers, but also often negative, certainly for large ﬁrms. Again,
large ﬁrms appear to have suﬀered most from market-stealing.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This study analyzed horizontal and vertical productivity spillovers of foreign direct invest-
ment on domestic Romanian companies from 1998 to 2001, a period when the Romanian
economy experienced substantial structural changes. We therefore employed a series of input-
output tables for the calculation of vertical spillovers to overcome possible bias in the results.
Since the lion’s share of foreign aﬃliates operate in the services sector, we study spillover ef-
fects for all industries, not just manufacturing. Indeed, we found indications that restricting
the analysis to manufacturing industries biases results, particularly with respect to backward
spillovers. We therefore strongly recommend that further studies neglect neither changes in
economic structure nor the tertiary sector.
We distinguished among ﬁve forms of spillover: two horizontal and three vertical. The
presence of foreign aﬃliates in the same or linked industries aﬀects local ﬁrm total factor
productivity in a non-linear way. Speciﬁcally, the level of technology, the degree of foreign
ownership, and local ﬁrm size were found to play important roles in this relation.
Horizontal labor market spillovers from fully and majority foreign-owned ﬁrms tended to
be positive and exhibit a clear U-shaped relationship with the level of technology. Horizontal
labor market spillovers were especially beneﬁcial when the labor came from fully foreign-
owned ﬁrms. Other net horizontal spillovers tended to be insigniﬁcant, with the exception
of a market-stealing eﬀect for large ﬁrms and the least productive domestic ﬁrms facing
competition from fully foreign-owned ﬁrms.
Vertical spillovers were found to be more important economically than horizontal spillovers.
This is distinctly the case for the supply-backward spillover: buying goods from ﬁrms that
also supply to foreign ﬁrms in a diﬀerent industry was found to enhance total factor produc-
tivity greatly, lending support to the theory of Markusen and Venables. Forward spillovers
were generally positive and exhibited a U-shaped relation with the level of technology across
size classes, although this relation is mostly driven by majority foreign-owned ﬁrms. This
lends support to the conjecture that both the Findlay and the absorptive capability hy-
pothesis are at work. Backward spillovers are generally positive for large ﬁrms, but often
23detrimental to small ﬁrms, unless these sell to industries with a large share of minority
foreign-owned aﬃliates. In the latter case, small ﬁrms tend to enjoy very positive backward
spillovers, provided their absorptive capability is suﬃciently high. This may be due to the
fact that foreign ﬁrms are unlikely to buy their inputs from small local ﬁrms unless they are
dominated by local partners.
So what was the net welfare eﬀect on the Romanian economy? When all spillover eﬀects
are accounted for, has foreign direct investment been beneﬁcial or detrimental to the total
factor productivity of local ﬁrms? We ﬁnd that the average Romanian ﬁrm enjoys positive
total net spillovers at any initial level of technology. The eﬀect is distinctly positive for ﬁrms
with the highest level of technology.
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27APPENDIX A: Production function estimation
We estimate the following production function sector by sector to derive sector-speciﬁc
labor and capital intensities.
∀j :l nVA irt = β0 + βl lnLirt + βk lnKirt + ωt + ηt (9)
where subscripts irt stand for ﬁrm i and region r at time t,a n dj stands for sector j. VA
stands for real value added of the ﬁrm, L is the freely variable input labor and K is the state
variable capital. The error has two components, the transmitted productivity component
given as ω,a n dη, an error term that is uncorrelated with input choices. The key diﬀerence
between ω and η is that the former is a state variable and hence impacts the ﬁrm’s decision
rules. ω is not observed by the econometrician; instead the ﬁrm immediately adjusts its
freely variable input L in response. We focus on value added rather than sales because it
is a better measure of ﬁrm performance. Consider the following version where small cases
refer to variables in logs and ﬁrm and region subscripts have been dropped.
vat = β0 + βllt + βkkt + ωt + ηt (10)
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) start by assuming that the demand for the intermediate
input, materials mt,d e p e n d so nt h eﬁrm’s state variables kt and ωt:
mt = mt (kt,ωt) (11)
Making mild assumptions about the ﬁrm’s production technology, it can be shown that the
demand function is monotonically increasing in ωt. This allows inversion of the intermediate
demand function, so ωt can be written as a function of kt and mt.13
ωt = ωt (kt,m t) (12)
The unobservable productivity term is now expressed solely as a function of two observed
inputs. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) make a ﬁnal identiﬁ-
13Due to possible correlation with labor and capital, direct FDI participation in the ﬁrm may distort
the estimation. We focus here solely on domestic ﬁrms. What about the spillovers? Since we estimate a
production function for each sector separately and because the spillover variables are sector-speciﬁc, there is
only variation in the time dimension. The correlation between spillover variables on one hand, and labor and
capital on the other, is fairly low (below 0.2 for almost all spillovers in all sectors). Furthermore, the possible
correlation will to some extent be accounted for in the analysis. If ωt is a function of foreign presence, this
will be reﬂected in material input choice as mt = mt (kt,ωt (foreign)). The inverted function would read
ωt = ωt (kt,m t (foreign)).
28cation restriction by assuming that productivity is governed by a ﬁrst-order Markov process:
ωt = E [ωt|ωt−1]+ξt (13)
where ξt is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kt (but not necessarily
with lt; this is part of the source of the simultaneity problem). The estimation routine itself
starts with transforming (10).
vat = β0 + βllt + βkkt + ωt + ηt (14)
= βllt + φt (kt,m t)+ηt
where
φt (kt,m t)=β0 + βkkt + ωt (kt,m t) (15)
By substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in kt and mt for φt (kt,m t),i ti s
possible to consistently estimate parameters as
vat = δ0 + βllt +
3 X
g=0
3−h X
h=0
δghk
g
tm
h
t + ηt (16)
where β0 is not separately identiﬁed from the intercept of φt (kt,m t). This completes the ﬁrst
stage of the estimation routine from Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), from which an estimate
of βl and an estimate of φt (up to the intercept) are available. The second stage of the
estimation procedure begins by computing the estimated value for φt using
b φt = c vat − b βllt (17)
= b δ0 +
3 X
i=0
3−i X
j=0
c δijk
i
tm
j
t (18)
For any candidate values β
∗
k , one can compute (up to a scalar constant) a prediction for ωt
for all periods t using
b ωt = b φt − β
∗
kkt (19)
Taking the b ωt’s for all t, a consistent (non-parametric) approximation to E [ωt|ωt−1],s a y
E
h
d ωt|ωt−1
i
, is given by the predicted values from the regression
b ωt = γ0 + γ1b ωt−1 + γ2b ω
2
t−1 + γ3b ω
3
t−1 + εt (20)
Given b βl, β
∗
k,a n dE
h
d ωt|ωt−1
i
the sample residual of the production function can be written
29as
d ηt + ξt = vat − b βllt − β
∗
kkt − E
h
d ωt|ωt−1
i
(21)
The estimate b βk of βk can then be deﬁned as the solution to14
min
β∗
k
X
t
³
vat − b βllt − β
∗
kkt − E
h
d ωt|ωt−1
i´2
(22)
Since each of the two main stages of estimation involves a number of preliminary estima-
tors, the covariance matrix of the ﬁnal parameters must account for the sampling variation
introduced by all of the estimators used in the two stages. Although deriving an analytic
covariance matrix may be feasible, this calculation is not trivial. Instead, Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) substitute computational power for analytic diﬃculties, employing the boot-
strap method to estimate standard errors.15
For the estimation the data are taken from the Amadeus database, described in the main
text. Value added is calculated as real output Y , measured as sales deﬂated by producer price
indices of the appropriate Nace industry minus real material input M, measured as material
costs deﬂated by a weighted intermediate input deﬂator where the industry-speciﬁcw e i g h t i n g
scheme is drawn from the IO tables. Labor L is expressed as the number of employees. Real
capital K is measured as ﬁxed assets, deﬂated by the average of the deﬂators for the following
ﬁve Nace industries: machinery and equipment (29); oﬃce machinery and computing (30);
electrical machinery and apparatus (31); motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and
other transport equipment (35). This approach follows Smarzynska Javorcik (2004).
14A golden-section search algorithm is used to minimize (22).
15Given the use of panel data, sampling occurs with replacement from ﬁrms, using the entire time series
of observations for that ﬁrm in the bootstrapped sample when the ﬁrm’s ID-number is randomly drawn. A
bootstrapped sample is complete when the number of ﬁrm-year observations (closely) equals the number of
ﬁrm-year observations in the original sample. The variation in the point estimates across the bootstrapped
samples provides an estimate for the standard errors of the original point estimates (see Petrin et al., 2004).
30APPENDIX B: Relation between spillover and technology gap
implied by results in Table 4
In each subﬁgure, the bold solid line represents the estimated relationship for all ﬁrms,
the ﬁne solid line refers to small ﬁrms, the dotted line to medium ﬁrms, and the broken line
to large ﬁrms. The level of technology (T) is shown on the horizontal axis, while the vertical
axis is the spillover eﬀect on total factor productivity.
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Figure 5: Spillovers to ﬁrm productivity (vertical axis) as a function of the level of technology
(horizontal axis) for diﬀerent classes of ﬁrm size
31APPENDIX C: The eﬀect of the degree of foreign ownership
All ﬁrms L<55 <=L<50 L>=50
Horizontal
L
full 1.377 1.726 1.216 0.783
[2.64]*** [3.08]*** [2.13]** [1.09]
T ∗ Horizontal
L
full -3.609 -6.908 -4.133 -2.895
[1.89]* [2.09]** [1.93]* [1.42]
T2∗Horizontal
L
full 3.387 8.157 4.981 2.490
[3.37]*** [3.82]*** [3.69]*** [1.90]*
Horizontal
L
maj 0.601 0.754 0.420 -0.589
[2.50]** [3.04]*** [1.53] [1.49]
T ∗ Horizontal
L
maj -2.701 -3.415 -2.429 0.326
[3.26]*** [2.42]** [2.45]** [0.35]
T2∗Horizontal
L
maj 2.421 2.973 2.393 0.475
[4.51]*** [2.12]** [3.17]*** [0.74]
Horizontal
L
min -0.353 -0.093 -0.226 0.450
[1.83]* [0.35] [1.09] [1.23]
T ∗ Horizontal
L
min 1.961 0.457 0.068 -0.386
[2.81]*** [0.30] [0.07] [0.38]
T2∗Horizontal
L
min -0.854 1.362 1.528 -0.082
[2.46]** [1.19] [2.19]** [0.14]
Horizontal
Y
full -0.797 -0.609 -0.699 -1.489
[0.98] [0.73] [0.81] [2.56]**
T ∗ Horizontal
Y
full 5.303 6.642 6.840 4.469
[3.78]*** [3.12]*** [4.57]*** [3.16]***
T2∗Horizontal
Y
full -3.360 -3.240 -5.827 -2.538
[4.49]*** [2.87]*** [6.43]*** [2.40]**
Horizontal
Y
maj 0.187 -0.095 0.251 0.201
[0.34] [0.15] [0.52] [0.41]
T ∗ Horizontal
Y
maj -1.918 3.032 -1.126 -1.653
[1.49] [1.31] [0.79] [1.43]
T2∗Horizontal
Y
maj 1.488 -2.134 -0.148 0.383
[1.97]** [1.08] [0.15] [0.47]
Horizontal
Y
min -0.485 -0.854 0.296 -0.951
[0.71] [1.25] [0.40] [1.16]
T ∗ Horizontal
Y
min 1.907 6.469 -2.423 -0.094
[0.89] [1.80]* [1.16] [0.04]
T2∗Horizontal
Y
min -2.478 -11.122 1.117 0.955
[1.99]** [4.54]*** [0.90] [0.53]
Backwardfull 2.516 2.783 2.801 1.857
[3.24]*** [3.25]*** [3.26]*** [2.79]***
32All ﬁrms L<55 <=L<50 L>=50
T ∗ Backwardfull -6.740 -12.078 -6.533 -2.695
[3.34]*** [3.58]*** [2.67]*** [1.64]
T2∗Backwardfull 1.045 2.636 0.246 -0.278
[1.36] [1.61] [0.27] [0.30]
Backwardmaj -3.285 -2.866 -3.548 -3.181
[5.35]*** [4.15]*** [5.35]*** [4.81]***
T ∗ Backwardmaj 5.258 2.575 5.035 6.454
[3.27]*** [0.93] [2.82]*** [3.72]***
T2∗Backwardmaj -1.412 0.038 -1.648 -2.563
[2.20]** [0.03] [2.46]** [2.54]**
Backwardmin -3.861 -4.455 -2.675 0.915
[1.84]* [1.90]* [1.16] [0.54]
T ∗ Backwardmin 13.070 13.354 2.282 -3.139
[2.21]** [1.26] [0.33] [0.62]
T2∗Backwardmin -8.079 0.786 4.370 6.813
[2.58]** [0.12] [1.35] [1.99]**
Forwardfull -1.749 -1.168 -2.272 -0.190
[1.66]* [1.06] [1.96]* [0.19]
T ∗ Forward full 1.163 -2.626 4.629 3.666
[0.40] [0.48] [1.40] [1.53]
T2∗Forwardfull -0.365 8.892 -3.042 -2.470
[0.22] [2.48]** [1.50] [1.82]*
Forwardmaj 5.205 4.877 5.382 3.203
[8.49]*** [7.33]*** [7.73]*** [5.74]***
T ∗ Forward maj -9.134 -4.410 -11.503 -7.050
[4.84]*** [1.14] [5.23]*** [3.70]***
T2∗Forwardmaj 5.899 -0.532 9.962 4.130
[4.77]*** [0.17] [6.95]*** [3.34]***
Forwardmin 1.403 0.393 1.233 8.025
[1.02] [0.25] [0.82] [4.56]***
T ∗ Forward min -11.563 7.151 -13.896 -28.214
[1.69]* [0.58] [1.91]* [4.62]***
T2∗Forwardmin 9.931 -11.816 10.749 23.609
[2.04]** [1.51] [2.03]** [4.96]***
SupplyBackwardfull 18.448 20.681 20.798 9.536
[6.61]*** [6.62]*** [6.97]*** [3.47]***
T ∗ SupplyBackwardfull -45.625 -87.280 -57.790 -12.508
[5.30]*** [4.64]*** [6.93]*** [1.66]*
T2∗SupplyBackwardfull 15.982 30.865 36.017 -3.712
[3.00]*** [2.27]** [6.38]*** [0.57]
SupplyBackwardmaj -10.255 -11.858 -8.892 -8.807
33All ﬁrms L<55 <=L<50 L>=50
[4.43]*** [4.49]*** [4.06]*** [4.60]***
T ∗ SupplyBackwardmaj 36.283 44.258 38.467 18.565
[6.19]*** [4.04]*** [7.05]*** [3.39]***
T2∗SupplyBackwardmaj -21.720 -23.112 -27.912 -9.371
[7.11]*** [2.99]*** [9.03]*** [2.10]**
SupplyBackwardmin -19.213 -22.351 -23.508 -6.741
[3.21]*** [3.05]*** [3.54]*** [1.31]
T ∗ SupplyBackwardmin 22.238 86.343 62.254 -9.967
[0.92] [1.90]* [2.41]** [0.44]
T2∗SupplyBackwardmin 6.072 -14.038 -46.450 18.299
[0.45] [0.52] [3.17]*** [1.10]
N 120317 56095 53348 10874
#ﬁrms 55097 30866 26351 4993
R2 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18
Robust t statistics in brackets; */**/*** signiﬁcant at 10%/5%/1%
Table 7: Eﬀe c to fd e g r e eo ff o r e i g no w n e r s h i p ,ﬁrm size
and the interaction of spillover variables with the level of
technology - Results for all industries
34All ﬁrms L<55 <=L<50 L>=50
F-tests
No T − Horizontal
Y
full 10.16*** 5.00*** 23.02*** 5.22***
No Horizontal
Y
full 6.78*** 3.34** 15.49*** 3.97***
No T − Horizontal
Y
maj 2.15 0.86 1.76 2.57*
No Horizontal
Y
maj 1.55 0.90 1.17 2.46*
No T − Horizontal
Y
min 2.88* 19.33*** 0.67 0.69
No Horizontal
Y
min 2.19* 14.36*** 0.51 1.27
No T − Horizontal
L
full 8.65*** 9.56*** 13.06*** 1.86
No Horizontal
L
full 6.87*** 8.28*** 9.76*** 1.28
No T − Horizontal
L
maj 11.48*** 2.94* 6.04*** 2.49*
No Horizontal
L
maj 7.96*** 3.32** 4.04*** 2.10*
No T − Horizontal
L
min 3.96** 6.34*** 19.81*** 0.92
No Horizontal
L
min 2.83** 5.36*** 13.84*** 1.83
No T − Backwardfull 11.03*** 11.08*** 16.52*** 6.68***
No Backwardfull 7.46*** 7.40*** 11.42*** 4.95***
No T − Backwardmaj 6.21*** 1.65 4.00** 11.94***
No Backwardmaj 9.60*** 6.74*** 10.55*** 8.83***
No T − Backwardmin 3.33** 4.49** 5.07*** 6.19***
No Backwardmin 2.41* 3.64** 3.38** 4.84***
No T − Forwardfull 0.12 10.40*** 1.14 1.66
No Forwardfull 1.10 7.55*** 1.49 1.32
No T − Forwardmaj 12.56*** 3.74** 27.03*** 6.91***
No Forwardmaj 28.70*** 27.79*** 34.78*** 11.47***
No T − Forwardmin 2.10 2.82* 2.09 12.42***
No Forwardmin 1.40 2.19* 1.45 9.51***
No T − Supply-Backwardfull 19.83*** 19.73*** 24.13*** 7.68***
No Supply-Backwardfull 16.89*** 18.76*** 18.95*** 6.84***
No T − Supply-Backwardmaj 25.35*** 9.17*** 42.08*** 8.15***
No Supply-Backwardmaj 17.01*** 8.05*** 28.34*** 7.15***
No T − Supply-Backwardmin 3.92** 5.66*** 5.62*** 1.14
No Supply-Backwardmin 5.92*** 5.41*** 7.14*** 2.99**
T-’Spillover’ tests the joint signiﬁcance of the T and T2 interactions, ’Spillover’ the joint signiﬁcance
of the T and T2 interactions and the level of Spillover.Columns 2-4 are split-samples according
to the domestic ﬁrm’s number of employees (L). */**/*** rejection at 10%/5%/1%.
Table 8: Eﬀect of degree of foreign ownership, ﬁrm size and the interaction of spillover
variables with the level of technology - Results for all industries - F-tests
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